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Charles Hogg

Charles is Commercial Director at Unsworth, one of the UK’s leading independent freight forwarding businesses. He brings unrivalled insight into the challenges facing international trade borders and the market that serves them. Charles is also National Chair of the British International Freight Association (BIFA) for two years following his appointment in May 2023.

Charles has extensive connections across the UK and international freight industry and has supported European and British traders of all sizes in adapting to new trade regulations.

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Thought Leadership

Capability is not sovereignty: a conversation on control, cost, and credibility in defence

TLDR In trade, politics, and defence, sovereign capability is a practical constraint on how organisations operate. As Christopher Salmon explains, capability without control is conditional. In an environment defined by export controls, supply chains, and geopolitical friction, sovereignty must be actively managed. Not assumed. Key insights Defence leaders should prioritise foresight, resilience, and real freedom of action over rhetorical “self-sufficiency.” Sovereign capability is not absolute. It exists on a spectrum defined by control, not ownership. Capability can be constrained by external permissions, particularly via export controls and licensing regimes. Industrial capacity (not just advanced technology) is central to credible sovereignty. The real cost of sovereignty often emerges in supply chains, compliance, and commercial limitations. In this article Hide 01 An illusion of control? 02 The compliance infrastructure behind sovereignty 03 Cost that doesn’t sit on the balance sheet 04 What the strongest organisations do differently 05 Sovereignty as a managed condition (function(){ function ready(fn){ if(document.readyState!=='loading') fn(); else document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded',fn); } ready(function(){ var toc = document.querySelector('.cb-toc'); if(!toc) return; var headings = [].slice.call(document.querySelectorAll('h2, h3')) .filter(function(h){ return !h.closest('table') && (h.textContent||'').trim().length>0; }); var links = [].slice.call(toc.querySelectorAll('a[data-toc-match]')); var n = 0; links.forEach(function(link){ var needle = (link.getAttribute('data-toc-match')||'').toLowerCase().trim(); if(!needle) return; var match = headings.find(function(h){ return (h.textContent||'').toLowerCase().indexOf(needle)!==-1; }); if(!match) return; if(!match.id){ var base = (match.textContent||'').toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g,'-').replace(/^-|-$/g,'').slice(0,48) || 'section'; var id = 'cb-'+base; while(document.getElementById(id)){ id = 'cb-'+base+'-'+(++n); } match.id = id; } match.style.scrollMarginTop = '96px'; link.setAttribute('href','#'+match.id); link.style.cursor = 'pointer'; }); links.forEach(function(link){ if(!link.getAttribute('href')){ var item = link.closest('[role="listitem"]'); if(item) item.remove(); } }); toc.querySelectorAll('a[data-toc-match]').forEach(function(a){ var original = a.style.color; a.addEventListener('mouseenter', function(){ a.style.color = '#c8102e'; }); a.addEventListener('mouseleave', function(){ if(!a.dataset.active) a.style.color = original; }); }); var toggle = toc.querySelector('.cb-toc__toggle'); var list = toc.querySelector('#cb-toc-list'); if(toggle && list){ toggle.addEventListener('click', function(){ var expanded = toggle.getAttribute('aria-expanded')==='true'; toggle.setAttribute('aria-expanded', String(!expanded)); toggle.textContent = expanded ? 'Show' : 'Hide'; list.style.display = expanded ? 'none' : ''; }); } toc.querySelectorAll('a[href^="#"]').forEach(function(link){ link.addEventListener('click', function(e){ var id = link.getAttribute('href').slice(1); var target = document.getElementById(id); if(!target) return; e.preventDefault(); target.scrollIntoView({ behavior:'smooth', block:'start' }); history.pushState(null,'','#'+id); }); }); var targets = [].slice.call(toc.querySelectorAll('a[href^="#"]')) .map(function(a){ return { link:a, target:document.getElementById(a.getAttribute('href').slice(1)) }; }) .filter(function(x){ return x.target; }); if('IntersectionObserver' in window && targets.length){ var map = {}; targets.forEach(function(x){ map[x.target.id] = x.link; }); var current = null; var io = new IntersectionObserver(function(entries){ entries.forEach(function(entry){ if(entry.isIntersecting){ if(current){ current.style.color = '#0b1f33'; current.style.fontWeight = ''; delete current.dataset.active; } var link = map[entry.target.id]; if(link){ link.style.color = '#c8102e'; link.style.fontWeight = '600'; link.dataset.active = '1'; current = link; } } }); }, { rootMargin:'-30% 0px -60% 0px', threshold:0 }); targets.forEach(function(x){ io.observe(x.target); }); } }); })(); Sovereign capability is politically and strategically necessary but, at times, operationally mishandled. As a phrase, sovereign capability is gaining significant attention across defence and policy circles. Christopher Salmon (clearBorder’s Chief Executive and former adviser to UK Cabinet Ministers on trade and border policy) has spent years working at the intersection of defence, regulation, and procurement. He makes clear that its meaning – and its limits – are often more complex than the language might suggest. “It is a bit of a buzzword,” he says candidly. “But the central concept isn’t new. What’s changed is the context. We’re no longer thinking in a ‘post-war’ environment. Increasingly, people are talking in ‘pre-war’ terms. That changes how seriously you take questions of control.” At its simplest, sovereign capability is intuitive. “It’s the technology you can use,” he explains, “without being restricted by somebody else.”  The challenge for aerospace, defence, and other sector leaders – in a fragmenting geopolitical world – is that simplicity rarely survives contact with reality. Why this matters For defence organisations especially, sovereign capability directly shapes both strategic and commercial outcomes. Procurement decisions today define operational freedom years down the line Supply chain dependencies introduce hidden geopolitical and regulatory risk Export controls and licensing frameworks can constrain growth and market access Getting to grips with the parameters of capability and sovereignty is essential for protecting delivery timelines, commercial viability, and long-term strategic autonomy. Independent, expert trade strategy & horizon scanning → An illusion of control? “Sovereign capability is not an absolute concept,” he says. “You’re not either sovereign capable or not sovereign capable. The more of the chain you control, the better. But you’re never going to control all of it. “People can slip into quite comforting language,” he continues. “We’ll build this, we’ll own that, we’ll be sovereign. But the reality is much more constrained.” In practice, capability and control are not the same thing. “You can own a system,” he says, “you can operate it, you can deploy it. But if there are restrictions on how you use it, modify it, or transfer it, then your sovereignty is already conditional.” Programmes such as AUKUS (and SSN-AUKUS submarines) illustrate this clearly: advanced capability can be delivered through alliance, while still operating within layers of shared control, regulatory constraint, and partner alignment. That conditionality is often overlooked at boardroom level, where strategic narratives can run ahead of operational detail. “There’s always been a desire for states to control their advantage,” he adds. “That hasn’t changed. What changes is what counts as strategic, and who controls it.” And, sometimes, the issue is less about advanced technology than it is about something far more fundamental. “It’s a question of capacity. It doesn’t matter how clever your system is if you can’t produce it at scale. If you’ve only got a million shells and you’re firing a million a week, you’ve got a problem very quickly.” The compliance infrastructure behind sovereignty “People often think of sovereign capability in terms of hardware,” Christopher says. “In practice, it’s governed by legal and regulatory frameworks, just as much as anything else.” Export controls, licensing regimes, national security interventions… these are not peripheral considerations. They define the boundaries of what is possible. Frameworks such as ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), for example, can extend control well beyond national borders. “You can buy something, integrate it, make it part of your system,” Christopher says. “But if it’s subject to external control, then the permission structure doesn’t sit with you.” In the UK, mechanisms such as the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act reinforce this further, embedding government oversight directly into transactions, ownership structures, and strategic supply chains.  This is where sovereign capability becomes less about ownership and more about good governance. For smaller organisations, this can show up as uncertainty. “Maybe they know they’re dealing with something sensitive,” he notes. “They know it’s dual-use, say, or regulated, or restricted. But they don’t always have the infrastructure to manage that properly.” For larger defence organisations, the stakes are higher – and more strategic. “The question becomes: do we build around something that gives us capability now, but constrains us later? Or do we invest in something that gives us more freedom of action long term?” That is not a compliance question. It’s a strategic one. Cost that doesn’t sit on the balance sheet Because sovereign capability is often overestimated in principle, it is frequently undercosted in practice. “Organisations will model the upfront cost,” Christopher says. “They won’t always model the downstream constraints.” And those constraints don’t always appear immediately. “They show up later,” he explains. “When you try to sell something and can’t. When you try to redeploy something and need permission. When your supply chain turns out to be more fragile than you thought.” In some cases, the issue is visibility. “Control lists change. Sanctions change. The environment shifts,” he says. “You may not even realise that something you’re dependent upon has become restricted.” In others, it is structural. “If you’re reliant on a particular component, or a particular material, or a particular jurisdiction,” he says, “then you are exposed. Whether you planned for that or not.” That kind of dependency is an expensive knot to untie. “The market will find alternatives,” he notes. “But it won’t be quick. And it won’t be cheap.” And then there’s the cost of reaction. “I think a lot of organisations are still responding to events,” he says. “The world is moving faster than they are. That’s where the real risk sits.” Not in the headline capability, but in the constraints beneath it. Because – by the time a constraint becomes visible – it is, often, already embedded. What the strongest organisations do differently Despite this complexity, sovereign capability is not an abstract problem, but a management discipline, and it requires a paradigm shift in how organisations conceptualise their operating environment. “The first thing is foresight,” he says. “You have to look ahead. You can’t just react.” “For a long time, businesses were forging ahead happily. New technology, new markets, new opportunities. Geopolitics was kind of in the background,” he explains. “That’s changed. Politics is now a much bigger part of business decision-making.” The implication is that supply chains, compliance, and geopolitical exposure all need to be treated as core operational concerns. “You manage your finances carefully. You need to manage your international supply chains in the same way. It’s more important to make sure they can hold up under pressure.” And it requires accepting that uncertainty is here to stay. “Doubt and ambiguity are part of the international system now,” he adds. “You have to plan for it.” Sovereignty as a managed condition The conversation around sovereign capability is not going away – if anything, it’s becoming more important – but, as Christopher makes clear, it needs to be understood on more realistic terms. “There’s no country in the world that doesn’t need to trade,” he says. “You’re always going to be dependent on something.” In the modern world, that renders ‘real’ sovereignty as something conditional. “Essentially, it’s about how much of the chain you control,” he says. “And what that allows you to do.” For defence leaders, the question isn’t  “are we sovereign?” – but: Where are we constrained? Where are we exposed? And where does control actually sit? Because sovereignty is something that has to be built, tested, and managed – continuously. As Christopher puts it, “the more of it you can genuinely hold onto… the better.” Borders For the Boardroom:  the clearBorder podcast Hear more from Christopher and the clearBorder team on defence, geopolitics, industrial capacity, supply chain risks, and more. Listen now on Spotify →  Listen now on Apple → 

Capability is not sovereignty: a conversation on control, cost, and credibility in defence
Defence

Is AUKUS becoming an “America First” franchise?

  Brief Overview AUKUS is entering a more complex phase of its life, where the sovereign capability of Australia and the UK is increasingly determined by the U.S., via ITAR, policy alignment, and regulatory control. For defence leaders, sovereignty may no longer be an absolute idea, but something that is conditional, managed, and operationally constrained. In this article Hide 01 Key highlights 02 The sovereignty paradox 03 The Australian dilemma: more muscle, less agency? 04 The UK perspective – An opportunity in Pillar II? 05 ITAR: “digital leash?” 06 ITAR “snapback” provisions 07 The commercial reality – where sovereignty gets tested 08 Partnership or “America First” franchise? – Sovereignty as a managed condition (function(){ function ready(fn){ if(document.readyState!=='loading') fn(); else document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded',fn); } ready(function(){ var toc = document.querySelector('.cb-toc'); if(!toc) return; var headings = [].slice.call(document.querySelectorAll('h2, h3')) .filter(function(h){ return !h.closest('table') && (h.textContent||'').trim().length>0; }); var links = [].slice.call(toc.querySelectorAll('a[data-toc-match]')); var n = 0; links.forEach(function(link){ var needle = (link.getAttribute('data-toc-match')||'').toLowerCase().trim(); if(!needle) return; var match = headings.find(function(h){ return (h.textContent||'').toLowerCase().indexOf(needle)!==-1; }); if(!match) return; if(!match.id){ var base = (match.textContent||'').toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g,'-').replace(/^-|-$/g,'').slice(0,48) || 'section'; var id = 'cb-'+base; while(document.getElementById(id)){ id = 'cb-'+base+'-'+(++n); } match.id = id; } match.style.scrollMarginTop = '96px'; link.setAttribute('href','#'+match.id); link.style.cursor = 'pointer'; }); links.forEach(function(link){ if(!link.getAttribute('href')){ var item = link.closest('[role="listitem"]'); if(item) item.remove(); } }); toc.querySelectorAll('a[data-toc-match]').forEach(function(a){ var original = a.style.color; a.addEventListener('mouseenter', function(){ a.style.color = '#c8102e'; }); a.addEventListener('mouseleave', function(){ if(!a.dataset.active) a.style.color = original; }); }); var toggle = toc.querySelector('.cb-toc__toggle'); var list = toc.querySelector('#cb-toc-list'); if(toggle && list){ toggle.addEventListener('click', function(){ var expanded = toggle.getAttribute('aria-expanded')==='true'; toggle.setAttribute('aria-expanded', String(!expanded)); toggle.textContent = expanded ? 'Show' : 'Hide'; list.style.display = expanded ? 'none' : ''; }); } toc.querySelectorAll('a[href^="#"]').forEach(function(link){ link.addEventListener('click', function(e){ var id = link.getAttribute('href').slice(1); var target = document.getElementById(id); if(!target) return; e.preventDefault(); target.scrollIntoView({ behavior:'smooth', block:'start' }); history.pushState(null,'','#'+id); }); }); var targets = [].slice.call(toc.querySelectorAll('a[href^="#"]')) .map(function(a){ return { link:a, target:document.getElementById(a.getAttribute('href').slice(1)) }; }) .filter(function(x){ return x.target; }); if('IntersectionObserver' in window && targets.length){ var map = {}; targets.forEach(function(x){ map[x.target.id] = x.link; }); var current = null; var io = new IntersectionObserver(function(entries){ entries.forEach(function(entry){ if(entry.isIntersecting){ if(current){ current.style.color = '#0b1f33'; current.style.fontWeight = ''; delete current.dataset.active; } var link = map[entry.target.id]; if(link){ link.style.color = '#c8102e'; link.style.fontWeight = '600'; link.dataset.active = '1'; current = link; } } }); }, { rootMargin:'-30% 0px -60% 0px', threshold:0 }); targets.forEach(function(x){ io.observe(x.target); }); } }); })(); Key highlights AUKUS is evolving from an equal partnership into a framework shaped by U.S. regulatory control, particularly ITAR Sovereign capability is increasingly conditional, defined by permissions, compliance, and policy alignment The “sovereignty paradox” remains central: ownership of capability does not guarantee operational control Australia gains significant military strength (for example SSN-AUKUS), but with potential constraints on autonomy The UK faces a split position: limited influence under Pillar I, but stronger opportunity in advanced technologies under Pillar II Pillar II (AI, cyber, autonomous systems) may offer a more flexible route to genuine, exportable sovereignty ITAR acts as a system of embedded, lifecycle control rather than just a regulatory framework “Snapback” provisions introduce uncertainty, making ITAR-light access conditional and reversible Sovereignty is most visibly tested in commercial realities such as supply chains, licensing, and data restrictions Defence leaders must actively manage sovereignty as an operational condition, not assume it as a given The honeymoon phase of AUKUS is officially over.  What began as a bold expression of allied ambition – shared capabilities, industrial integration, and broad strategic alignment – is now bumping into the realities of regulation, sovereignty, and control. In this new “Trump 2.0” era, some tensions have become harder to ignore. Ambitious strategic goals are colliding with the mechanics of export controls, U.S. licensing regimes, and national policy alignment. At the centre of this sits ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) as the governing force. Tricky questions are emerging: is AUKUS a partnership of equals… or a system of conditional control? Does the U.S. (via ITAR) keep a “digital leash” on Australia and the UK, controlling on how far their sovereign capability can really extend? Why this matters For defence organisations, AUKUS is not just a geopolitical construct. It directly affects how capability is developed, deployed, and monetised. Understanding where control sits, and how quickly it can shift, is critical to managing risk, maintaining market access, and protecting long-term strategic autonomy. Independent, expert trade strategy & horizon scanning → The sovereignty paradox AUKUS promises sovereign capability. In practice, it delivers that capability within a tightly governed framework of shared control. This is the sovereignty paradox with AUKUS.  Defence platforms may be nationally owned. Industrial capacity may be domestically developed. But the ability to deploy, modify, transfer, or export that capability remains embedded in a system of permissions, approvals, and alignment requirements. In other words: Capability does not always equal autonomy Ownership does not always equal control Sovereignty is, sometimes, beholden to the permission of others This is not necessarily a flaw in AUKUS. It may be better-read as a structural feature of how modern defence alliances function… particularly when they are built on asymmetric regulatory regimes. The Australian dilemma: more muscle, less agency? For Australia, a trade-off has come into focus. AUKUS offers Canberra a significant uplift in military capability, most notably through the nuclear-powered attack submarine the SSN-AUKUS (under Pillar I of AUKUS), with initial delivery expected in the early/mid 2030s. This is, in many ways, a “very big stick” in modern defence posture. But that capability comes with (the possibility of) an additional cost. There is also the potential for pressure being applied to Australia, by the U.S., if it ever required military intervention or assistance.  The central question emerging in Australian politics and defence is whether the country is gaining sovereign defence capability, or underwriting a US-aligned security architecture, in which ultimate control sits in Washington. Dependence on US technology, licensing, and approval frameworks introduces constraints such as: Limits on independent deployment decisions Restrictions on modification and integration Reduced flexibility in third-country engagement From a commercial and operational perspective, this creates long-term dependency that is not easily unwound. Australia may be strengthening its military position, but the degree to which it controls that capability is open to debate. The UK perspective The UK finds itself dealing with a different, but not entirely unrelated, tension. On one hand, there is the perception (reinforced by political rhetoric) that the UK risks being relegated to a high-end subcontractor role. Trump’s comments mocking British carriers as “toys,” in the context of US shipbuilding backlogs, contribute to a sense that the UK’s military importance within AUKUS is not considered particularly… important.  On the other hand though, there is a more nuanced and potentially more important development taking place beneath the surface. An opportunity in Pillar II?  While the submarine programme remains tied up in layers of regulatory friction, AUKUS Pillar II (focused on “advanced capability” areas such as AI, cybersecurity, and autonomous systems) tells a different story. Here, the UK is beginning to establish a foothold in areas such as: Autonomous underwater systems Artificial intelligence Advanced sensing and data integration These technologies are fast becoming central to how defence capability is delivered. And crucially, they could offer a slightly different definition of “sovereignty:” one that is harder to describe exclusively with traditional weaponry and military hardware. This is one area where the UK and Australia may be able to innovate – and potentially export – without having to ask permission from Washington. Conventional ideas of sovereignty, in this context, are not entirely absent. But they are uneven. “True sovereignty” might exist under Pillar II of AUKUS, but likely not under Pillar I, and so… can that really be called “true sovereignty”? ITAR: “digital leash?” At the heart of this is ITAR. Often described as a regulatory framework, ITAR might be more accurately understood as a system of embedded control. It governs not just the export of defence articles, but their use, modification, integration, and onward transfer. Once ITAR-controlled components or technologies are introduced into a system, they bring with them a set of obligations that extend throughout the lifecycle of that system. In this way, control is not exercised through overt intervention, but through: Licensing requirements and end-use screening Data restrictions Re-export controls on complex goods Ongoing compliance obligations These mechanisms shape what is (and what isn’t) possible for a component or software long after the initial transfer has taken place. ITAR “snapback” provisions 2026 reforms to ITAR were widely positioned as a breakthrough; an effort to reduce friction within trusted alliances and enable more seamless collaboration. But the introduction of “snapback” provisions complicates that narrative.  ITAR-free or ITAR-light arrangements are not (necessarily) permanent. They can be withdrawn by the U.S., if the Administration feels an ally’s policy position has diverged from its international priorities. In other words: ITAR-free is a privilege. For defence organisations, this introduces layers of uncertainty: Programmes might be built on assumed access and could face disruption Investments may be exposed to policy shifts Long-term planning, inevitably, becomes complicated The commercial reality – where sovereignty gets tested For all the geopolitical framing, the real impact of these dynamics is felt at operational levels. This is an often-overlooked frontline of sovereignty, which gets tested in: Supply chain design Licensing timelines Subcontractor selection Cross-border data flows Delays in approval processes can affect delivery schedules. Restrictions on technology transfer can limit collaboration. Customs compliance requirements can reshape how organisations structure their operations. Sovereignty, then, is not only determined in policy papers and machines of war, but also in commercial execution. Partnership or “America First” franchise? Which brings us back to the central question: has AUKUS become an “America First” franchise? AUKUS remains an important alliance strategically, built on shared interests and mutual benefit. But it also operates within a framework in which control and autonomy are not always evenly distributed. The United States, through ITAR and related mechanisms, retains significant influence over how capability is developed, deployed, and transferred. This does not necessarily negate the value of the partnership. But it does redefine it. Sovereignty as a managed condition For Australia and the UK, the idea of sovereign capability under AUKUS is not a fiction. But it isn’t absolute, either.  It is… conditional. Structured. Governed. Increasingly, it must be understood as something that is managed – through compliance, alignment, and operational discipline – rather than simply “owned outright”. And, for defence leaders, the challenge is scanning the horizon for early signals of exactly how new expressions of sovereignty might be exercised in practice. And, ultimately, who owns the terms under which they can be exercised. Borders For the Boardroom  the clearBorder podcast Listen now on Spotify →  Listen now on Apple → 

Is AUKUS becoming an “America First” franchise?
Thought Leadership

What is sovereign capability? A strategic guide for defence leaders and procurement teams

TLDR No longer just a policy concept, sovereign capability has become a central issue in defence strategy and procurement. In practice, sovereignty is shaped by supply chains, alliances, and regulatory control; and, for defence leaders, it must be actively managed, not assumed. Key insights Sovereign capability is increasingly shaped by supply chains, alliances, and export controls Defence procurement decisions determine long-term control (not just cost) “Full” sovereignty is rarely achievable. Most capability is conditional Governance, compliance, and visibility are central to maintaining operational control Sovereign capability has become one of the defining themes in modern defence.  It sits at the intersection of geopolitics, procurement, and industrial strategy, and is increasingly shaping how nations design, build, and deploy military capability. Yet, despite its prominence, the concept is evolving. For defence leaders, the challenge is not simply to define “sovereign capability” in traditional terms, but to understand what it actually requires in practice, and where its limits sit in a deeply interconnected global system. Why this matters For defence organisations, sovereign capability directly affects operational and commercial outcomes: Programme delivery timelines can be shaped by external approvals and licensing Supply chain dependencies can introduce hidden strategic risk Regulatory frameworks can constrain how systems are deployed or exported Procurement decisions increasingly determine long-term control, not just cost Understanding sovereign capability is therefore essential to protecting both operational readiness and strategic autonomy. Independent, expert trade strategy & horizon scanning → What is sovereign capability in defence? At its simplest, sovereign capability is a nation’s ability to design, produce, maintain, and deploy defence capabilities independently. This includes traditional and digital weapons of war, military strength, firepower, and related complex goods, software, or hardware. However, the concept extends further. It includes not just physical ownership of platforms, but control over the systems, technologies, and decisions that govern their use. This encompasses industrial capacity, supply chain visibility, and the ability to act without external constraint. That distinction is important. As with Australia’s acquisition of SSN-AUKUS submarines under AUKUS, a nation may possess advanced defence assets, but still rely on foreign technology, components, or regulatory approval – in this example, via ITAR – to operate them. In this sense, sovereignty is not absolute. It exists on a spectrum. In other words, capability does not always equal autonomy, and ownership does not always equal control. Why sovereign capability matters in modern defence strategy The growing focus on sovereign capability reflects a shift in the global defence environment. Geopolitical fragmentation, export controls, and supply chain disruption have all made reliance on external actors more complex and, in some cases, more risky.  As a result, governments are reassessing where control must sit, and how much dependency is acceptable. Sovereign capability has, therefore, become a question of national resilience. It influences whether a nation can act independently, how quickly it can respond to emerging threats, and how exposed it is to external political or regulatory pressure. For defence leaders, this translates into tangible concerns around delivery, readiness, and long-term strategic positioning. Sovereign capability and defence procurement For most defence organisations, sovereign capability is ultimately realised (or constrained) through procurement. Procurement decisions determine not only what is acquired, but where capability resides, and who controls it over time. Increasingly, this requires a shift in thinking. Where procurement was once driven primarily by cost and performance, it now must account for resilience, control, and regulatory exposure. Procurement trade-offs in the defence industry As such, modern defence procurement involves navigating a set of competing priorities: Priority Strategic benefit Associated risk Global sourcing Access to advanced technology and scale Increased dependency and regulatory exposure Domestic production Greater control and national resilience Higher cost and longer delivery timelines Rapid procurement Accelerated capability deployment Reduced scrutiny and potential compliance gaps Collaborative programmes Shared cost and innovation Constraints on sovereignty and operational freedom   These trade-offs are not easily resolved. They must be actively managed, at boardroom level, as part of a wider defence strategy. The role of the UK defence industry in sovereign capability As the world’s second-largest defence exporter, the UK plays a not-insignificant role in the industry globally, with an established pedigree and leadership in disciplines such as advanced manufacturing, systems integration, and defence services. These capabilities position the UK as both a potential contributor to allied programmes and a developer of strategic capabilities in its own right. However, at the same time, the UK operates within a highly interconnected, complicated, and often tense international ecosystem.  Supply chains are global, technologies are shared, and regulatory frameworks – particularly end-use agreements and export controls – shape how capability can actually be developed and deployed. This creates a dual reality: the UK does hold clear industrial leadership in some domains, but it also faces structural dependencies that influence how sovereign its capabilities can be in practice. Sovereignty vs collaboration: can defence alliances deliver both? With few exceptions internationally, modern defence capability is not built in splendid isolation. The world of defence is more connected than that. Alliances such as NATO and AUKUS determine how nations access technology, share costs, and accelerate innovation. However, collaboration introduces its own constraints. Shared systems and technologies may be subject to external controls, including export licensing and usage restrictions. This can limit how capability is deployed or transferred, even when it is nominally “owned” by a national government. As a result, sovereignty and collaboration must be balanced carefully. Sovereignty, in this context, is less about independence and more about management of interdependence – understanding where control is retained, where it is shared, and how those boundaries are governed. The operational reality: what sovereign capability requires in practice Delivery of sovereign capability depends on the underlying systems and processes that enable organisations to operate effectively, within a constrained and sensitive environment. Two areas are particularly critical: Governance, compliance, and control Export controls, licensing regimes, and national security regulations all play a central role in shaping how defence capability can be used. To manage this, organisations must develop robust governance frameworks that ensure: Accurate classification of components and systems Clear visibility of regulatory obligations The ability to demonstrate compliance under audit Without this governance infrastructure, sovereignty becomes difficult to exercise in practice, regardless of strategic intent. Supply chain visibility and industrial resilience Modern defence systems rely on complex networks of suppliers, often spanning multiple jurisdictions. Understanding these dependencies – and their associated risks – is essential. A single component can introduce regulatory constraints, or a single supplier can create costly strategic vulnerability: as we saw in the AOG Technics fraud case. For defence organisations, sovereignty increasingly depends on how well these risks are identified, monitored, and managed. The cost of sovereign capability Conventionally, sovereign capability is usually framed as a strategic imperative, but it does come with measurable costs. There is financial investment, yes, but organisations must also consider increased complexity, longer procurement timelines, and higher governance overheads. In some cases, pursuing a traditional idea of “unconditional sovereignty” may require duplication of capability that would otherwise be shared across alliances. For nations, this raises an important question: what level of sovereignty is necessary? For many, the answer lies not in absolute independence, but in identifying critical capabilities where control must be retained, and accepting some level of dependency elsewhere. Is sovereign capability realistic in 2026 and beyond? As defence systems become more complex and interconnected, the idea of a complete and unerring national autonomy is becoming harder to sustain. Supply chains are global, technologies are shared, and regulatory frameworks are increasingly influential. In this environment, sovereign capability is evolving. Rather than being absolute, it is becoming more: Selective, focused on key strategic capabilities Conditional, shaped by alliances and regulation Actively managed, through governance and procurement decisions This perspective changes how the notion of sovereign capability should be approached. Sovereign capability as a strategic discipline Sovereign capability remains central to defence strategy, but it is not a simple concept to define.  Rather, in the modern era, it is more of a movable feast. It is constantly reshaped by procurement choices, constrained by regulation, and pressure-tested through operations. It requires organisations to balance independence with collaboration, and control with efficiency. For defence leaders, the challenge is not simply to “achieve” sovereignty, but to understand where it matters, how it is constrained, and how it can be maintained over time. Because – in modern defence – sovereignty is not assumed, and nor is it perennial. It is something that must be intentionally designed, built, and continuously managed, as the sands of international geopolitics continue to shift.  Borders For the Boardroom  the clearBorder podcast Listen now on Spotify →  Listen now on Apple →   

What is sovereign capability? A strategic guide for defence leaders and procurement teams

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