Executive summaryOn a recent visit to China to catch up with clients and partners, I was reminded that the balance of power in global trade is shifting. China’s manufacturers are looking abroad for markets while Washington tightens tech controls and Beijing develops its own tools of economic leverage. The meeting between Xi, Trump, and Putin brought these tensions into focus – and raised tough questions for firms caught between competing powers. |
China has gone from poverty to power in little more than a generation, and Shanghai from a submissive trade outpost of foreign powers to global trade leader.
While I was in China, Putin, Trump, and Xi met in Shenzhen, another 20+ million city port to “settle the new world order”, in, we are told, an echo of the Yalta Conference that defined the post-WWII world.
I’m not sure that bears too much comparison: the statesmen at Yalta were leading allied powers to victory. In Shenzhen, the participants are more likely marching towards war than away from it: two are failing in conflicts against much smaller adversaries. Only Xi looks truly secure.
Governance advisory on international trade →
Shanghai: power and trade, then and now
The discussions in Shenzhen are about power. And power drives politics, which in turn drives trade. But while power and politics are in flux, businesses need to pay attention.
Shanghai itself provides an example of what this means in real life. Its prominence in global trade today is the product of the interplay between power, politics, and trade.
Global Shanghai emerged when a corrupt and declining power – the Qing dynasty – met a rampant power, the British Empire at the dawn of the industrial age. The Treaty of Nanjing (1842) allowed the British (and French, and Americans) to impose their own laws in Shanghai and forced the Chinese to accept their trade, most notoriously in opium. They stayed until the Second World War.
That was then. Today, the terms are different.
China has wealth and, increasingly, power. Shanghai has turned its submission into dominance as one of the most important hubs for trade on the globe and now, Chinese businesses need markets for their surplus goods.
Certainly, Britain and France, but even America, now entertain Chinese terms for trade in critical products like minerals and EV batteries.
They must now grapple with China’s own extraterritorial laws governing critical technologies. So, what does the power play in Shenzhen today tell us about trade tomorrow?
Technology: Washington fights to protect its lead
The US is worried about protecting its dominance in technologies of the coming age, AI especially.
As Trump flew in, the US Commerce Department added restrictions to AI chips, effective 19 November. The US now requires licences for the export of advanced node chips to data centres that provide “significant” computing power (over 50% of compute capacity) to Chinese companies.
Export of chips to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil require licences following the NVIDIA scandal.
The effect – if implemented in full – would be enormous, particularly for SE Asia.
China accounts for 75% of SE Asia’s AI demand. Perhaps 30% of China’s advanced computing power will come from overseas by next year (either smuggled or rented).
The US wants to protect its advantage, but this won’t be easy. Companies will find ways around the controls and China will invest in domestic capacity. Quite possibly, the US may negotiate away some of these protections under pressure from China itself.
Trade: China’s surplus needs somewhere to go
China wants markets for its products and, for all the spectacular growth in Chinese production over the last two decades, the economy is slowing. Every conversation I had mentioned it. China has built too many car factories, battery plants and PV fabricators for the domestic market. They have product and not enough buyers; cash and not enough opportunities.
“It’s a matter of survival,” says one lawyer close to Western and Chinese firms. “If they can’t sell product abroad, they go bust. They have already consolidated. They don’t have a choice.” Bankruptcy is not something that state-led economies like to tolerate – it looks too much like failure – so Chinese government and business are locked in an effort to find markets and investment opportunities abroad.
That’s why we see Chinese cars flooding our streets and Chinese capital heading abroad. It’s also why Western tariffs are rising and the world of ‘free’ trade is receding. China will use its own technology, capital and trade laws to resist Western pressure.
It already has laws directed against foreign sanctions, trade barriers and international compliance mandates. Decree 834 prohibits Chinese entities from participating in ESG audits, forced labour investigations and detailed supply chain mapping. Decree 835 makes it illegal for companies or individuals operating in China to comply with Western trade restrictions, such as export controls or sanctions.
These laws create a direct contradiction: if you comply with one set of laws you violate the other. Expect China to use these laws more assertively and Western businesses to face more stay / go decisions.
Energy: Putin’s last bargaining chip
Russia’s influence on trade is almost entirely destructive. Putin’s principal contribution has been to necessitate a swathe of Western sanctions and compliance designed to shrink the country’s military capacity. But there is one thing Russia has that the world needs: energy.
Energy is about the only card Russia has left, and it will certainly feature in the country’s attempt to re-insert itself into world trade. Expect high energy prices to make that a near-irresistible temptation for Western consumers.
But don’t expect much from Russia, or soon. Expect more disruption.
If you are looking for the Qing dynasty of today, Putin’s Russia provides it.
| Borders For the Boardroom: Episode 16 | Sanctions on Russia
Chris and Sarah discuss the historical context, and how sanctions applied to Russia impact companies in more ways than might initially be apparent. |