Thought Leadership

Ian Hunt

Trade Control Consultant

When you, your organisation or an employee has work pertaining to government or public projects, it’s sometimes necessary to obtain a security clearance (sometimes referred to as a Security Check). It might be that you’re involved in the import or export of controlled goods, for instance; or you’re contracted to work on government projects in the UK, and your operations will involve crossing the border. In situations such as this, to avoid risk and bolster national security, the UK government might require a security clearance process.

There are four main government security levels, as stipulated by the Ministry of Justice:

  • Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS) / Enhanced Baseline Standard (EBS)
  • Security Check (SC)
  • Counter Terrorist Check (CTC)
  • Developed Vetting (DV)

With efficiency and speed so vitally important, this leads many to ask the question: how long does SC clearance take?

What is the Security Clearance Process? How to Get Security Clearance in the UK

In order to get security clearance, you must follow a process known in the UK as national security vetting (UK government). This involves a series of background checks about the applicant, their situation and personal history, and is used to determine any risks in granting access to potentially-sensitive material.

The government provides a vetting explainer on their website which contains more information. The vetting charter also provides information about what the applicant can expect.

Depending on the type of clearance being applied for, national security vetting can typically take from six to 18 weeks.

The security clearance process can be split into five sections:

1. Applying for / renewing security clearances

Note: this is not applicable to applicants for an Accreditation Check.

You need to have a sponsor with UK citizenship. This is usually a human resources officer, a personnel officer or security controller. The sponsor will confirm the need for security clearance and the appropriate level.

With this completed, the applicant will be given a link to complete a security questionnaire.

2. Activating the NSVS portal and submitting questionnaire

Again, this section is not applicable to applicants undergoing an Accreditation Check.

The government provides information and guidance on the National Security Vetting Solution (NSVS) portal on its website.

If the government requires further information, they will contact the applicant directly while they perform the necessary cross-checks.

3. The vetting interview

Vetting officers will contact the applicant to arrange a vetting interview, which typically takes around three hours.

The interview will consist of some questions concerning the applicant, their life and their personal history. Vetting officers conduct an interview in order to build a complete picture of the applicant, and determine factors such as:

  • Loyalty, honesty, reliability and vulnerabilities
  • Extended family background, including influences and relationships
  • History of drug taking (if any)
  • Financial affairs
  • General political views
  • History of foreign travel
  • Hobbies and lifestyle.

4. Decision processing

With the security clearance process completed, there will follow a period of adjudication, and a decision will be reached as to whether the applicant presents a risk to national security.

If officers deem the applicant unsuitable to be granted access to sensitive assets, they will deny security clearance; this signals that the application has been unsuccessful. In the event of clearance being denied, the applicant will be informed of the reasons why this decision was taken.

5. Appeals process

There is an appeal process available for applicants who have had their clearance withdrawn or denied.

What are the different types of Security Clearance?

Within the four levels of clearance (BPSS, SC, CTC and DV), there are seven separate types of clearances. Below, we’ll walk through each of the clearances in turn.

Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS)

The BPSS is recognised as the standard security clearance for the pre-employment screening of individuals with access to sensitive government assets. Though not a formalised security clearance per se, its application is the foundation for further vetting processes.

An number of private companies offer BPSS checks, in line with government requirements. On average, BPSS checks take approximately 6 days.

Accreditation Check (AC)

AC clearances are needed for people who have independent access to controlled areas in UK airports and are typically valid for 5 years, provided the sponsoring organisation is in ongoing compliance with provision of data. Where this requirement is not met, AC checks last for 12 months. Some elements will be performed by the employer, an airport operator or air carrier.

Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) / Level 1B

CTC checks are needed for individuals who work in close proximity to public and government figures, or whose career brings them into contact with assets which might be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. CTC security clearance takes a minimum of 6 weeks, and must be formally reviewed after 10 years (or 5 years for non-List X contractors).

Security Check (SC)

This is required for people who will have far-reaching access to SECRET, or occasional controlled access to TOP SECRET assets. SC clearance asserts that the individual would not pose a risk in handling sensitive information. The answer to the question, how long does SC clearance take can vary, but on average the process will typically last for 6 weeks.

Enhanced Security Check (eSC)

Similar in nature to SC, an eSC grants regular uncontrolled access to SECRET assets, and supervised access to TOP SECRET information where necessary. It is used for roles where security clearance in excess of SC is needed, but not up to the level of DV.

Developed Vetting (DV)

Developed Vetting is the highest level of security clearance, intended for individuals with regular uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET assets. It would also be required for those working in high-level Intelligence or Security services. DV must be formally reviewed at intervals not exceeding 7 years, and will take a minimum of 18 weeks to obtain.

Enhanced Developed Vetting (eDV)

The only remaining security clearance level is Enhanced Developed Vetting, limited and available to a very small number of individuals. It will only be considered where an exceptional amount of unrestricted access is required to TOP SECRET information, justifying the necessity of clearance in excess of DV level.

eDV may only be requested by an extremely limited number of Sponsors, and only by prior agreement with UKSV and the Cabinet Office.

SC Clearance Eligibility & Requirements

With the basic information regarding each SC clearance established, we’ll turn our attention to the eligibility criteria, extent of asset access, and relevant checks pertaining to each SC level.

Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS)

Any individual with access to government assets will need BPSS. This would include civil servants, military personnel, temporary department staff, and any government contractor.

They will gain authorisation to access:

  • UK OFFICIAL assets and occasional access to UK SECRET assets
  • Possible entry into areas where SECRET and TOP SECRET information may be discussed
  • Individuals requiring access to Public Services Network (PSN).

It is important to understand how to get BPSS clearance. To obtain BPSS (Baseline Personnel Security Standard) clearance, you need to complete a detailed application form, provide proof of identity and residence, undergo employment and criminal record checks, and sometimes pass a basic security interview.

BPSS checks will involve:

  • The applicant’s identity
  • Employment history of the past 3 years
  • National and immigration (right to work) status
  • Any unspent criminal record
  • An account of any period spent abroad exceeding 6 months within the past 3 years.

Accreditation Checks (AC)

AC clearances are needed for any persons fulfilling work responsibilities or a job role which:

  • Necessitate an Airport Identification Card or UK air carrier Crew Identification Card
  • Facilitate UK aviation security training
  • Perform validation procedures of air cargo security standards.

Accreditation Checks will involve the verification of:

  • The applicant’s identity
  • Employment and education history (including gaps) of at least the past 5 years
  • Any unspent criminal record
  • A cross-reference against UK government records or related agencies.

Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) / Level 1B

People whose work brings them into close proximity with public figures deemed to be at risk from terrorism will require CTC clearance.

They will gain authorisation to access:

  • Some information judged to be vulnerable to terrorist exploitation or of value to terrorists
  • Unsupervised access to some military, civil, industrial or commercial locations deemed to be vulnerable to terrorist attack.

CTC checks involve:

  • Completion of the BPSS
  • Completion of a security questionnaire
  • Departmental/company records checks
  • A check on criminal conviction history
  • A check of MI5 records
  • In some cases, an interview.

Security Check (SC)

If an employee has frequent, unsupervised access to SECRET or periodical access to TOP SECRET information, they will need SC clearance. SC clearance is also required for people who:

  • Could be in a position to cause a similar degree of damage while not occupying the role
  • Have sufficient knowledge to build an accurate picture of SECRET data or information
  • Are a candidate for employment where career progress would be inhibited without SC for SECRET assets
  • Might need access to classified material originating overseas.

Security Check processing will consider elements such as:

  • Successful completion of the BPSS Baseline Personnel Security Standard
  • Completion of a security questionnaire
  • Departmental/company records
  • Spent and/or unspent criminal records
  • Credit and financial history
  • MI5 records
  • Possibly, an interview
  • in the event of unresolved financial matters, a separate financial questionnaire

Enhanced Security Check (eSC)

An Enhanced Security Check would be needed for an individual requiring to access SECRET and (occasional access to) TOP SECRET assets, but not requiring full DV clearance. It is only available to holders of:

  • Positions where there is a necessity to access SECRET code word material
  • Positions that have been designated as needing eSC clearance
  • Overseas positions that expose the employee to espionage threats and/or a lower level of management oversight.

The following checks may be involved in eSC:

  • Completion of the Baseline Personnel Security Standard
  • Completion of Security / Financial / Internet Questionnaire
  • a departmental/company records check
  • Spent/ unspent criminal records
  • Financial history
  • MI5 records
  • A detailed interview
  • An assessment of assets, liabilities, income and expenditure, including those pertaining to a spouse or partner.

Developed Vetting (DV)

Only those individuals needing regular and substantial, independent access to TOP SECRET classified information, or relevant codewords, would need to seek DV clearance.

Similarly, if a person might:

  • conceivably affect a similar amount of damage while not the official holder of a post
  • require frequent uncontrolled access to Category 1 nuclear material, or
  • be privy to high-level overseas classified data they may need DV clearance.

DV checks involve the following procedures:

  • Successful completion of the BPSS
  • Completion of a DV security questionnaire
  • Departmental/company records checks
  • A check of spent and unspent criminal records
  • A check of credit and financial history
  • A check of Security Service (MI5) records
  • A review of personal finances
  • A detailed interview and further enquiries
  • A full review of personal finances taking into account the joint position with a spouse or partner.

Enhanced Developed Vetting (eDV)

As stated, only a very small number of posts may request or hold eDV clearance.

eDV checks involve:

  • Completion of a DV security questionnaire, including a family and travel element
  • A full criminal record check
  • A Security Services check
  • A credit reference check
  • A financial investigation
  • An applicant interview
  • A supervisor interview
  • A referee interview
  • A full review of personal finances, taking into account the joint position with a spouse or partner.

Securing SC (Security Check) clearance in international trade, particularly for members of the armed forces in the United Kingdom, requires a thorough and structured process. The requirements and procedures can vary depending on the organisation, but generally, the process involves completing an extensive application form detailing personal information, employment history, and residence details. Applicants must also provide proof of identity and undergo comprehensive background checks, including a criminal record check and a credit reference check. Additionally, interviews may be conducted to assess the individual’s suitability for clearance. The specific steps and additional requirements may differ slightly depending on the organisation and the sensitivity of the role within the international trade sector.

FAQs

Now that we know more about the various security clearance levels, along with their eligibility requirements and the extent of access they facilitate, we’ll get to grips with some of the most frequently asked questions our clients have regarding security clearances.

If you’re wondering how long does security clearance take, or have any other questions about the process, don’t hesitate to contact our team today.

How long does security clearance last?

BPSS checks do not expire, though they may be repeated by new employers.

Security Check (SC) classification is valid for 5 years for government contractors and 10 years for permanent employees. Moreover, it is transferable between departments.

Can you fail SC clearance?

To put it briefly: yes, it is possible to fail SC clearance.

This means the individual’s application has been unsuccessful, and access to relevant assets denied. There are a number of reasons why a clearance application may be unsuccessful, including:

  • The existence of a criminal record
  • Issues surrounding citizenship
  • Financial irregularities, inconsistencies or instabilities
  • An incomplete or inaccurate application

How can I check my clearance status in the UK?

In order to check the status of your security clearance application, get in touch with your vetting officer. Alternatively, you may be able to find more information through the UKSV.

Ensure Ongoing Security Clearance with Cross-border Specialists

Though it can be a confusing and laborious process, failure to obtain the proper security clearances can impede your operations, prevent bidding on certain projecst and limit employment opportunities. The best way to mitigate this risk and ensure that you or your employees possess the necessary clearance is to seek a consultation with our expert team.

If you want to discuss the nature of your operations further, and the types of security clearance you might be required to make an application for, utilise our specialist cross-border consultancy services and get in touch with clearBorder today.

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HMRC issues Morrisons a £4.7m warning importers can’t afford to ignore

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HMRC issues Morrisons a £4.7m warning importers can’t afford to ignore
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In this article Hide 01 An illusion of control? 02 The compliance infrastructure behind sovereignty 03 Cost that doesn’t sit on the balance sheet 04 What the strongest organisations do differently 05 Sovereignty as a managed condition (function(){ function ready(fn){ if(document.readyState!=='loading') fn(); else document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded',fn); } ready(function(){ var toc = document.querySelector('.cb-toc'); if(!toc) return; var headings = [].slice.call(document.querySelectorAll('h2, h3')) .filter(function(h){ return !h.closest('table') && (h.textContent||'').trim().length>0; }); var links = [].slice.call(toc.querySelectorAll('a[data-toc-match]')); var n = 0; links.forEach(function(link){ var needle = (link.getAttribute('data-toc-match')||'').toLowerCase().trim(); if(!needle) return; var match = headings.find(function(h){ return (h.textContent||'').toLowerCase().indexOf(needle)!==-1; }); if(!match) return; if(!match.id){ var base = (match.textContent||'').toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g,'-').replace(/^-|-$/g,'').slice(0,48) || 'section'; var id = 'cb-'+base; while(document.getElementById(id)){ id = 'cb-'+base+'-'+(++n); } match.id = id; } match.style.scrollMarginTop = '96px'; link.setAttribute('href','#'+match.id); link.style.cursor = 'pointer'; }); links.forEach(function(link){ if(!link.getAttribute('href')){ var item = link.closest('[role="listitem"]'); if(item) item.remove(); } }); toc.querySelectorAll('a[data-toc-match]').forEach(function(a){ var original = a.style.color; a.addEventListener('mouseenter', function(){ a.style.color = '#c8102e'; }); a.addEventListener('mouseleave', function(){ if(!a.dataset.active) a.style.color = original; }); }); var toggle = toc.querySelector('.cb-toc__toggle'); var list = toc.querySelector('#cb-toc-list'); if(toggle && list){ toggle.addEventListener('click', function(){ var expanded = toggle.getAttribute('aria-expanded')==='true'; toggle.setAttribute('aria-expanded', String(!expanded)); toggle.textContent = expanded ? 'Show' : 'Hide'; list.style.display = expanded ? 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That conditionality is often overlooked at boardroom level, where strategic narratives can run ahead of operational detail. “There’s always been a desire for states to control their advantage,” he adds. “That hasn’t changed. What changes is what counts as strategic, and who controls it.” And, sometimes, the issue is less about advanced technology than it is about something far more fundamental. “It’s a question of capacity. It doesn’t matter how clever your system is if you can’t produce it at scale. If you’ve only got a million shells and you’re firing a million a week, you’ve got a problem very quickly.” The compliance infrastructure behind sovereignty “People often think of sovereign capability in terms of hardware,” Christopher says. “In practice, it’s governed by legal and regulatory frameworks, just as much as anything else.” Export controls, licensing regimes, national security interventions… these are not peripheral considerations. They define the boundaries of what is possible. Frameworks such as ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), for example, can extend control well beyond national borders. “You can buy something, integrate it, make it part of your system,” Christopher says. “But if it’s subject to external control, then the permission structure doesn’t sit with you.” In the UK, mechanisms such as the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act reinforce this further, embedding government oversight directly into transactions, ownership structures, and strategic supply chains.  This is where sovereign capability becomes less about ownership and more about good governance. For smaller organisations, this can show up as uncertainty. “Maybe they know they’re dealing with something sensitive,” he notes. “They know it’s dual-use, say, or regulated, or restricted. But they don’t always have the infrastructure to manage that properly.” For larger defence organisations, the stakes are higher – and more strategic. “The question becomes: do we build around something that gives us capability now, but constrains us later? Or do we invest in something that gives us more freedom of action long term?” That is not a compliance question. It’s a strategic one. Cost that doesn’t sit on the balance sheet Because sovereign capability is often overestimated in principle, it is frequently undercosted in practice. “Organisations will model the upfront cost,” Christopher says. “They won’t always model the downstream constraints.” And those constraints don’t always appear immediately. “They show up later,” he explains. “When you try to sell something and can’t. When you try to redeploy something and need permission. When your supply chain turns out to be more fragile than you thought.” In some cases, the issue is visibility. “Control lists change. Sanctions change. The environment shifts,” he says. “You may not even realise that something you’re dependent upon has become restricted.” In others, it is structural. “If you’re reliant on a particular component, or a particular material, or a particular jurisdiction,” he says, “then you are exposed. Whether you planned for that or not.” That kind of dependency is an expensive knot to untie. “The market will find alternatives,” he notes. “But it won’t be quick. And it won’t be cheap.” And then there’s the cost of reaction. “I think a lot of organisations are still responding to events,” he says. “The world is moving faster than they are. That’s where the real risk sits.” Not in the headline capability, but in the constraints beneath it. Because – by the time a constraint becomes visible – it is, often, already embedded. What the strongest organisations do differently Despite this complexity, sovereign capability is not an abstract problem, but a management discipline, and it requires a paradigm shift in how organisations conceptualise their operating environment. “The first thing is foresight,” he says. “You have to look ahead. You can’t just react.” “For a long time, businesses were forging ahead happily. New technology, new markets, new opportunities. Geopolitics was kind of in the background,” he explains. “That’s changed. Politics is now a much bigger part of business decision-making.” The implication is that supply chains, compliance, and geopolitical exposure all need to be treated as core operational concerns. “You manage your finances carefully. You need to manage your international supply chains in the same way. It’s more important to make sure they can hold up under pressure.” And it requires accepting that uncertainty is here to stay. “Doubt and ambiguity are part of the international system now,” he adds. “You have to plan for it.” Sovereignty as a managed condition The conversation around sovereign capability is not going away – if anything, it’s becoming more important – but, as Christopher makes clear, it needs to be understood on more realistic terms. “There’s no country in the world that doesn’t need to trade,” he says. “You’re always going to be dependent on something.” In the modern world, that renders ‘real’ sovereignty as something conditional. “Essentially, it’s about how much of the chain you control,” he says. “And what that allows you to do.” For defence leaders, the question isn’t  “are we sovereign?” – but: Where are we constrained? Where are we exposed? And where does control actually sit? Because sovereignty is something that has to be built, tested, and managed – continuously. As Christopher puts it, “the more of it you can genuinely hold onto… the better.” Borders For the Boardroom:  the clearBorder podcast Hear more from Christopher and the clearBorder team on defence, geopolitics, industrial capacity, supply chain risks, and more. Listen now on Spotify →  Listen now on Apple → 

Capability is not sovereignty: a conversation on control, cost, and credibility in defence
Thought Leadership

What is sovereign capability? A strategic guide for defence leaders and procurement teams

TLDR No longer just a policy concept, sovereign capability has become a central issue in defence strategy and procurement. In practice, sovereignty is shaped by supply chains, alliances, and regulatory control; and, for defence leaders, it must be actively managed, not assumed. Key insights Sovereign capability is increasingly shaped by supply chains, alliances, and export controls Defence procurement decisions determine long-term control (not just cost) “Full” sovereignty is rarely achievable. Most capability is conditional Governance, compliance, and visibility are central to maintaining operational control Sovereign capability has become one of the defining themes in modern defence.  It sits at the intersection of geopolitics, procurement, and industrial strategy, and is increasingly shaping how nations design, build, and deploy military capability. Yet, despite its prominence, the concept is evolving. For defence leaders, the challenge is not simply to define “sovereign capability” in traditional terms, but to understand what it actually requires in practice, and where its limits sit in a deeply interconnected global system. Why this matters For defence organisations, sovereign capability directly affects operational and commercial outcomes: Programme delivery timelines can be shaped by external approvals and licensing Supply chain dependencies can introduce hidden strategic risk Regulatory frameworks can constrain how systems are deployed or exported Procurement decisions increasingly determine long-term control, not just cost Understanding sovereign capability is therefore essential to protecting both operational readiness and strategic autonomy. Independent, expert trade strategy & horizon scanning → What is sovereign capability in defence? At its simplest, sovereign capability is a nation’s ability to design, produce, maintain, and deploy defence capabilities independently. This includes traditional and digital weapons of war, military strength, firepower, and related complex goods, software, or hardware. However, the concept extends further. It includes not just physical ownership of platforms, but control over the systems, technologies, and decisions that govern their use. This encompasses industrial capacity, supply chain visibility, and the ability to act without external constraint. That distinction is important. As with Australia’s acquisition of SSN-AUKUS submarines under AUKUS, a nation may possess advanced defence assets, but still rely on foreign technology, components, or regulatory approval – in this example, via ITAR – to operate them. In this sense, sovereignty is not absolute. It exists on a spectrum. In other words, capability does not always equal autonomy, and ownership does not always equal control. Why sovereign capability matters in modern defence strategy The growing focus on sovereign capability reflects a shift in the global defence environment. Geopolitical fragmentation, export controls, and supply chain disruption have all made reliance on external actors more complex and, in some cases, more risky.  As a result, governments are reassessing where control must sit, and how much dependency is acceptable. Sovereign capability has, therefore, become a question of national resilience. It influences whether a nation can act independently, how quickly it can respond to emerging threats, and how exposed it is to external political or regulatory pressure. For defence leaders, this translates into tangible concerns around delivery, readiness, and long-term strategic positioning. Sovereign capability and defence procurement For most defence organisations, sovereign capability is ultimately realised (or constrained) through procurement. Procurement decisions determine not only what is acquired, but where capability resides, and who controls it over time. Increasingly, this requires a shift in thinking. Where procurement was once driven primarily by cost and performance, it now must account for resilience, control, and regulatory exposure. Procurement trade-offs in the defence industry As such, modern defence procurement involves navigating a set of competing priorities: Priority Strategic benefit Associated risk Global sourcing Access to advanced technology and scale Increased dependency and regulatory exposure Domestic production Greater control and national resilience Higher cost and longer delivery timelines Rapid procurement Accelerated capability deployment Reduced scrutiny and potential compliance gaps Collaborative programmes Shared cost and innovation Constraints on sovereignty and operational freedom   These trade-offs are not easily resolved. They must be actively managed, at boardroom level, as part of a wider defence strategy. The role of the UK defence industry in sovereign capability As the world’s second-largest defence exporter, the UK plays a not-insignificant role in the industry globally, with an established pedigree and leadership in disciplines such as advanced manufacturing, systems integration, and defence services. These capabilities position the UK as both a potential contributor to allied programmes and a developer of strategic capabilities in its own right. However, at the same time, the UK operates within a highly interconnected, complicated, and often tense international ecosystem.  Supply chains are global, technologies are shared, and regulatory frameworks – particularly end-use agreements and export controls – shape how capability can actually be developed and deployed. This creates a dual reality: the UK does hold clear industrial leadership in some domains, but it also faces structural dependencies that influence how sovereign its capabilities can be in practice. Sovereignty vs collaboration: can defence alliances deliver both? With few exceptions internationally, modern defence capability is not built in splendid isolation. The world of defence is more connected than that. Alliances such as NATO and AUKUS determine how nations access technology, share costs, and accelerate innovation. However, collaboration introduces its own constraints. Shared systems and technologies may be subject to external controls, including export licensing and usage restrictions. This can limit how capability is deployed or transferred, even when it is nominally “owned” by a national government. As a result, sovereignty and collaboration must be balanced carefully. Sovereignty, in this context, is less about independence and more about management of interdependence – understanding where control is retained, where it is shared, and how those boundaries are governed. The operational reality: what sovereign capability requires in practice Delivery of sovereign capability depends on the underlying systems and processes that enable organisations to operate effectively, within a constrained and sensitive environment. Two areas are particularly critical: Governance, compliance, and control Export controls, licensing regimes, and national security regulations all play a central role in shaping how defence capability can be used. To manage this, organisations must develop robust governance frameworks that ensure: Accurate classification of components and systems Clear visibility of regulatory obligations The ability to demonstrate compliance under audit Without this governance infrastructure, sovereignty becomes difficult to exercise in practice, regardless of strategic intent. Supply chain visibility and industrial resilience Modern defence systems rely on complex networks of suppliers, often spanning multiple jurisdictions. Understanding these dependencies – and their associated risks – is essential. A single component can introduce regulatory constraints, or a single supplier can create costly strategic vulnerability: as we saw in the AOG Technics fraud case. For defence organisations, sovereignty increasingly depends on how well these risks are identified, monitored, and managed. The cost of sovereign capability Conventionally, sovereign capability is usually framed as a strategic imperative, but it does come with measurable costs. There is financial investment, yes, but organisations must also consider increased complexity, longer procurement timelines, and higher governance overheads. In some cases, pursuing a traditional idea of “unconditional sovereignty” may require duplication of capability that would otherwise be shared across alliances. For nations, this raises an important question: what level of sovereignty is necessary? For many, the answer lies not in absolute independence, but in identifying critical capabilities where control must be retained, and accepting some level of dependency elsewhere. Is sovereign capability realistic in 2026 and beyond? As defence systems become more complex and interconnected, the idea of a complete and unerring national autonomy is becoming harder to sustain. Supply chains are global, technologies are shared, and regulatory frameworks are increasingly influential. In this environment, sovereign capability is evolving. Rather than being absolute, it is becoming more: Selective, focused on key strategic capabilities Conditional, shaped by alliances and regulation Actively managed, through governance and procurement decisions This perspective changes how the notion of sovereign capability should be approached. Sovereign capability as a strategic discipline Sovereign capability remains central to defence strategy, but it is not a simple concept to define.  Rather, in the modern era, it is more of a movable feast. It is constantly reshaped by procurement choices, constrained by regulation, and pressure-tested through operations. It requires organisations to balance independence with collaboration, and control with efficiency. For defence leaders, the challenge is not simply to “achieve” sovereignty, but to understand where it matters, how it is constrained, and how it can be maintained over time. Because – in modern defence – sovereignty is not assumed, and nor is it perennial. It is something that must be intentionally designed, built, and continuously managed, as the sands of international geopolitics continue to shift.  Borders For the Boardroom  the clearBorder podcast Listen now on Spotify →  Listen now on Apple →   

What is sovereign capability? A strategic guide for defence leaders and procurement teams
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